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INTRODUCTION
“I will inhabit my name” writes the poet St John Perse 1 to
highlight how the name can make a person and symbolise his/her
∗

Doctor in Law; Lecturer, University of Essex (United Kingdom).
1. ST JOHN PERSE, EXIL, VI (1942). Alexis Saint Léger, French citizen of
Guadeloupe, took the pseudonym of Saint John Perse. Some also translate as “I
will live my name.”
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identity. Certainly, a person cannot be reduced to a name as Juliet
warns us:
What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd,
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name,
And for that name which is no part of thee
Take all myself. 2
Nonetheless, “a necessary and usual sign of personality, the
name concentrates personality and expresses it.” 3 Some cultures
even believe that changing names could cure a person of illhealth. 4 Embodiment of a person, the name is protected both in
article 24-2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and in article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties.
It thus should not come as a surprise that both England and
France declare that the name cannot be object of a property right.
Though the name embodies so much of a person, it cannot be
considered as a thing or good on which one holds property rights.
So to the question “is the name property?” the answer is a
straightforward “no.” End of the matter then? Not quite. The
study of Du Boulay v. Du Boulay, 5 where the Privy Council
affirms the English law position, reveals that France and England
did not have the same approach in 1869. The case revolved around
the question of what protection French law, as applied in the
Caribbean island of Saint Lucia, offered to the person whose name
was used by another. 6 If the Privy Council concluded that French

2. W. SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, Act 2, Scene 2, lines 43-48
(1594).
3. R. NERSON, LES DROITS EXTRAPATRIMONIAUX 33 (LGDJ 1939).
4. J. Carbonnier refers to the oriental beliefs that to change a person’s name
when ill will cure this person. 1 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL: LES PERSONNES
190 (PUF 1957).
5. Du Boulay v. Du Boulay, L.R. 2 PC 430 (1869).
6. Because the Treaty of 1815, which marked the end of Napoleon’s
Empire, conceded to the United Kingdom the Caribbean island Saint Lucia,
former French colony alongside Martinique and Guadeloupe, French law was
applicable at the time. Martinique, from where the plaintiffs originated from,
and Guadeloupe remained French territories. For a history of Saint Lucia, see
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law offered no protection because the various pertinent legislations
in question had not been introduced in Saint Lucia for specific
registration, it did not dispute the fact that the said legislation was
presented as embodying a “property right” in the name. And
indeed, in 1869, the traditional justification in French law courts, a
justification which dated back to the 18th century, was that the
name is property, albeit a different kind of property than that of
other goods or things. Only at the very end of the 19th century was
this perception overturned, 7 allowing, in that respect, French law
to become identical to English law. But why, then, did France
maintain for so long a position so contrary to that of England? Can
the name be related to property? Do we have to revise the takenfor-granted distinction between persons and things, at least for the
name?
The question is even more puzzling when one compares in
detail the French and English laws of surnames. Indeed, despite
now the common affirmation that there is no property right on the
name, English and French laws differ significantly in their
specifics, and that difference appears to challenge their shared
agreement on the name not being property. English law considers
that a person is at liberty to change name with no limit other than
that of not committing fraud; correlatively, a person cannot forbid
a stranger to use his/her name: “the mere assumption of a name,
which is the patronymic of a family, by a stranger who had never
before been called by that name, whatever cause of annoyance it
may be to the family, is a grievance for which our Law affords no
redress.” 8 Those two attributes of English law reinforce the idea
that a person does not seem to “own” his/her name: s/he exercises
a liberty which stretches as far as allowing him/her to assume
different names, whatever inconvenience such attitude can create,
as long as there is no fraud.
By contrast, to an outsider, French law can appear to create a
property right or at least a proprietary interest in the name. Indeed,

H. BREEN, ST LUCIA: HISTORICAL, STATISTICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE (Longman,
Brown, Green and Longmans 1844), available also on Google Books.
7. See Du Boulay. The doctrine played a major role in this evolution which
became accepted “truth,” despite sporadic decisions of the courts affirming the
contrary until mid-twentieth century, See Cass. Civ., March 1st, 1957 BULL.
1957, 2, 129; Cass. Civ., June 11th, 1963, GAZ PAL. 2, 290 (1963).
8. Du Boulay.
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contrary to what happens in English law, a person cannot change
names on his/her own accord and has various rights of action
before the courts, notably when someone else uses his/her name
without his/her consent, even if there is no fraud. It is as if the
plaintiff “owns” his/her name and that “ownership” is sufficient to
trigger legal protection against any use of the name “owned.” 9
And yet, French law is adamant that there is no property right in
the name.
One can only wonder how English and French laws, opposite
in their features, can nonetheless reach the same conclusion.
Surely, one or the other got it wrong? Could it be French law, as it
used to affirm exactly the contrary until the early 20th century?
The Privy Council case of Du Boulay seems to suggest so.
However, the topic deserves a more thorough investigation,
especially when one looks at the third feature of the law of
surnames, i.e. whether a person can or cannot dispose of his/her
name by contract or by will.
In English law a will can be drafted so as to include a “name
and arms” clause, which typically transfers the land or any other
property to another person on the condition that he (or more rarely,
she) takes the name of the testator. This possibility to dispose of
one’s own name seems to contradict completely the English law’s
affirmation that a person has no property right to his/her name.
This time, is it English law that misunderstood the true nature of
the name?
Comparison with French law only increases the confusion.
Indeed, in France, a person cannot transfer his/her name by will or
even by contract, a prohibition that seems to confirm the claim that
there is no property right to the name in French law. But then, how
can it be reconciled with the other components of the French law
of surnames, which seem to suggest the contrary?
To provide the beginning of an answer to those various
questions, we will first have to go back in time, at least for French
law. As the work of the French legal historian Anne LefebvreTeillard demonstrated, the French law of surnames has changed
dramatically since the Middle Ages, whereas English law, as far as
we could gather, does not seem to have undergone any profound

9. See R. Munday, The French Law of Surnames: A Study in Rights of
Property, Personality and Privacy, 6 LEGAL STUDIES 79, 88-90 (1986).
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transformation. 10 This evolution of French Law affected not only
its features, but also the different theoretical rationales it developed
to explain those features.
Compared with English law, this analysis will shed new light
on our original question–“is the name property?”–in view of the
three elements of the law of surnames: whether a person can or
cannot dispose of one’s own name (I), protect it (II), and change it
(III).
I. TO DISPOSE OF ONE’S NAME:
SYMBOL OF A PROPERTY RIGHT?
Roman law recognized that a person could dispose of his name
(gens) by requiring a beneficiary of a donation or a will to bear his
name in exchange for receiving the goods or property. 11 Whether
this practice survived the collapse of the Roman Empire in the 5th
century is unclear, but it somehow reappeared in the Middle Ages
in connection with arms and land possessed by the nobility. In
English law, “inserted in a will or settlement by which property is
given to a person,” 12 the name and arms clause imposes on him
“the condition that he shall assume the surname and arms of the
testator or settlor, with a direction that if he neglects to assume or
discontinues the use of them, the estate shall devolve on the next
person in remainder.” 13
To what extent this ancient practice to dispose of one’s own
name is used nowadays is difficult to say, for the last legal
challenge was in 1962. 14 Yet it remains a feature of modern
English law, whereas French law currently ignores it. “Currently”
must we emphasize, because until the mid-nineteenth century, the
practice was still alive. English and French laws of surnames have
not always diverged in their features (A), albeit the theoretical
10. A. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, LE NOM: DROIT ET HISTOIRE (PUF 1990).
11. See H. HOULLIER DE VILLEDIEU, DE LA PROPRIETE DES NOMS
PATRONYMIQUES EN DROIT ROMAIN ET EN DROIT FRANÇAIS 32-34 (Oudin
Poitiers, thèse 1883); and E. PERREAU, LE DROIT AU NOM EN MATIERE CIVILE
153-154 (Sirey 1910). Both authors cite De Officiis by Cicero.
12. E. JOWITT, THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW (Sweet & Maxwell
1959), v. “Name and arms clause.”
13. Id.
14. In Re Neeld, Carpenter v. Inigo-Jones and others, CA (1962) All E.R.
335, (1962) Ch. 643.
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justification by which French lawyers explained this opportunity to
dispose of one’s own name promotes a reassessment of whether
the name is property or not (B).
A. The Practice: French Variations and English Constancy
The name and arms clause is one of those features English law
seems to have always known but whose origins are quite uncertain.
According to Lord Evershed, “the existence of clauses of this kind
for a hundred years or more in the precedent books and the absence
until 1945 of any reported attempt to challenge their validity is, I
venture to think, somewhat impressive;” 15 a statement which Lord
Upjohn affirmed: “Names and arms clauses have been known for
the best part of two hundred years.” 16 Certainly, cases attesting of
the practice go back up to the 18th century, but it is probably safe to
presume that the clause, regarded as “relics of feudalism” by a
modern commentator, 17 was introduced around the 12th century
when surnames appeared and started to symbolise a noble
household, its reputation, and its wealth. Originally used by the
nobility, the clause allows for an estate to remain within the
family, under its name and arms, in a situation where the latter
would have disappeared, if it were not for the clause.
In accordance with custom, for the name and the law of arms,
only direct male heirs are entitled to take the name and arms; in
their absence, name and arms cease to be transmitted to the next
generation and simply disappear. So although the land and the
related property would be transmitted to the family through the
remaining female line, the connection between land and name, and
possibly coat of arms, would be lost. To avoid such possibility, a
testator who wishes to maintain his name and arms alive will use a
name and arms clause, requiring his daughter, her children and/or
her spouse, or even his nephew, to bear his name and arms as a
condition to inherit the estate or part of the estate 18 given. Failure
to comply with the clause would simply lead to the loss of the

15. Id. at 344 (dissent).
16. Id. at 354.
17. O. M. Stone, Name Worship and Statutory Interpretation in the Law of
Wills, 26 MOD. L. REV. 652, 656 (1963).
18. Barlow v Bateman, (1730) 3 P Wms 65.
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estate, which would pass in remainder to the next person identified
in the will, who also would have to take the name and arms.
The effectiveness of the clause in passing names, in connection
to estates, to several generations down the line is best illustrated in
In Re Neeld 19 decided by the Court of Appeal in 1962. T, the
testator, devised a will where two names and arms clauses were at
stake: one by which the name Inigo-Jones should be used, and
another by which the name and arms of Neeld should be taken.
What is interesting is that the first name was the testator’s initial
surname, before he changed it in 1941 to comply with a name and
arms clause, that of Neeld, as settled in Neeld’s will in 1855,
nearly a century before. In other words, one clause was a way of
perpetuating his own name (Inigo-Jones) despite his change of
surname; the other clause allowed for the other name (Neeld) to be
maintained, by making sure that the original name and arms clause
drafted in 1855 would still be complied with by the second and
third generations. 20 Obviously, ensuring the diversity of names
was not the sole purpose of the second clause: there were property
interests at stake that the testator did not wish to forfeit.
Notwithstanding, the name and arms clause is an effective means
to secure the use of a name that would otherwise become
extinguished.
Such possibility to transfer one’s own name to future
generations had not always found approval. In 1766, Lord
Mansfield considered the clause as “silly;” 21 and it is true that
nowadays the clause appears to be “a relic of a bygone age,” 22 for
some, “English law . . . show[ing] far too much tolerance of the
mythology which the dead past imposes on the living present.” 23
Not surprisingly then, from 1945 onwards, a series of cases
threatened the clause’s existence. The courts held a number of
clauses too uncertain in their requirements, e.g. the testator not
specifying when the change of name must be effective. 24 They
19. In Re Neeld.
20. Id. at 338.
21. Gulliver d. Corris v Ashby, (1766) 4 Burr 1930, 1941 (“so silly a
condition as this is”).
22. In Re Neeld, at 466 (Cross J.).
23. Stone, supra note 17, at 657.
24. Re Bouverie, Bouverie v Marshall, (1952) 1 All ER 408, (1952) Ch. 40;
Re Woods Will Trusts, Wood v Donnelly, (1952) 1 All ER 740, (1952) Ch. 406;
Re Murray, Martins Bank Ltd v Dill, (1955) Ch 69, (1954) 3 All ER 129, CA;
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also declared the clauses contrary to public policy “in so far as they
affect the names of married women or their husbands” 25 and force
either the wives not to adopt their husbands’ or husbands to adopt
their wives’ family name. The courts’ eagerness “to control these
relics of feudalism” 26 came to a halt in 1962 when the Court of
Appeal concluded that the “wind of change developed against
these clauses in a number of authorities . . . was but a light, fickle
and variable breeze.” 27 Even the dissenting Lord Evershed
thought that “if clauses of this king, which have been part of the
conveyancing system in our country for very many years, ought
now to be treated as contrary to public policy, that is a matter for
Parliament rather than for the courts.” 28 Parliament not having
intervened, the name and arms clauses continue to be a feature of
English law of surnames, allowing people to transfer their own
names, and sometimes their coats of arms, at the same time as their
property.
In the 21st century, the contrast with French law could not be
more striking. Modern French law ignores such possibility, and
the clause is conspicuous by its absence in current law books. Yet,
like in English law, the name and arms clause had been a feature of
the French law of surnames for hundreds of years. The clause was
part of the mechanism of the saisine, a concept born in the Middle
Ages. Literally, saisine means the action of seizing, of taking over
and in that sense, there may well be a connection with the English
concept of seisin which refers to feudal possession. 29 Legally
though, the saisine is the use of a “thing” (chose) corporeal or
incorporeal which closes, with time passing by, the possibility for
others to complain about it. 30

and Re Howard's Will Trusts, Levin v Bradley, (1961) Ch 507, (1961) 2 All ER
413.
25. Stone, supra note 17, at 656.
26. Id. at 656.
27. In Re Neeld, at 354 (Lord Upjohn, for the majority).
28. Id. at 347.
29. The scope of this article did not allow us to investigate the matter, but it
would be an interesting subject for a legal historian. See for example, E. LEHR,
ELÉMENTS DE DROIT CIVIL ANGLAIS § 368 (Larose-Forsel 1885), who uses the
term of “saisine” to translate the “livery of seisin” of English law. Whether the
author knew of the Middle Ages concept remains to be investigated, in a future
research project.
30. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 44.
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Applied to the name, 31 the saisine has exactly the same feature
as the name and arms clause in English law. It will allow for the
use of the name by persons other than those in the direct male line
and who are still part of the same household. Indeed, a nobleman
who has only daughters or has no heirs at all can transfer, to his
son-in-law, grandson, or nephew, his name which would otherwise
become extinguished for lack of direct male heirs. The clause
would be inserted either in his daughter’s wedding contract or in
his will, often on the condition that if other collateral male heirs
exist they would consent to the transfer. 32
Like in English law, assumption of the name was sufficient to
satisfy the clause. After all, the saisine is about the use of the
name for a certain period of time–the longer the better. Still, on
both sides of the Channel, those who changed their name to
comply with a clause may wish to secure their new name (and
position) by seeking the Crown’s approval, in the form of, in
French law, a letter patent,33 and in English law, a royal licence, an
Act of Parliament, or more rarely a letter patent. 34
With similar origins as its English counterpart, the name and
arms clause in old French law served the same purpose:
perpetuating a name in connection with arms and an estate,
primarily within the nobility. Hence, the French Revolution, with
its quest to abolish any sign associated with the nobility, should
have seen the disappearance of the clause. However, despite its
feudal origins, the practice survived the turmoil of the Revolution.
In the first half of the 19th century, the Cour de cassation
(hereinafter, Court of Cassation) the French supreme court for civil
and criminal matters, and even the Conseil d’Etat (hereinafter,

31. The “saisine” has been used in other areas, like inheritance law. See P.
OURLIAC & J. L. GAZZANIGA, HISTOIRE DU DROIT PRIVE 207-209 (1985).
32. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 46; 2 DENISART, COLLECTION
DE DECISIONS NOUVELLES ET DE NOTIONS RELATIVES A LA JURISPRUDENCE
ACTUELLE 256 (Desaint 1766); and 12 GUYOT, REPERTOIRE UNIVERSEL ET
RAISONNE DE JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE, CRIMINELLE, CANONIQUE ET BENEFICIALE

175 (Visse 1784).
33. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 107-109.
34. One is recorded in 1317 about arms, in DOM PEDRO DE ALCAZAR, LAWS
ARMS
IN
MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND,
available
at
OF
http://www.sca.org/heraldry/laurel/lexarm.html (last visited November 6, 2008).
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Council of State), 35 decided a few cases attesting to the use of
name and arms clauses either in wedding contracts 36 or in wills. 37
But that the practice survived was a Pyrrhic victory, and by the
second half of the 19th century, English and French laws stopped
converging. Indeed, the context in which the clause was born and
has developed has fundamentally changed in France, but not in
England. Whereas the liberty to change names remained in
English law, it was abolished in French law with the law of 6
fructidor an II (1794). From then on, nobody could assume a new
name by reputation as was the practice before the Revolution, or as
is still the practice in English law. In order to use a new name, one
has to ask for an official change of name prior to that use and in
accordance with the administrative procedure established by law of
11 germinal an XI (April, 1803). Copied more or less on the
administrative procedure used before the Revolution for the letters
patent granted by the King, 38 the procedure means that the person
has to establish what would later be called a “legitimate reason” to
change his name. 39
Whether a name and arms clause can constitute such
“legitimate reason” after the Revolution is unclear. The procedure
is mainly administrative and only extensive research in the French
Government’s archives would allow for an accurate answer.
However, one case of 1831 shows that the French Government, at
least in the early 19th century, was not necessarily adverse to the
name and arms clause. 40 An ordonnance (hereinafter, ordinance)
of 1815, taken in accordance with the procedure of 1803,
authorised the son-in-law to take the names (and title) of his wife’s
father, 41 once the latter died. Better, the same case reveals that
sixteen years later, the Council of State, the French ‘supreme
court’ 42 for administrative matters, is not hostile per se to the
clause. Indeed, the court considered that the period of one year to
35. CE, December 16th, 1831 S. 1832 II 103.
36. Cass. Civ., January 13th, 1813, S. 1812-1814, 1, 259.
37. Cass. Req., November 16th, 1824, S.V. 1822-1824, 1, 561; S. 1825, 1,
148. The case was actually cited by the plaintifs in Du Boulay.
38. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 128-130.
39. The requirement is in the French Civil Code, article 60 al.1.
40. CE, December 16th, 1831 S. 1832 II 103.
41. Id.
42. Until the law of May 24th, 1872, the Council of State was not fully
independent (possibility for its decisions to be overturned).
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oppose the ordinance does not start at the time when the ordinance
was granted but at the time when the condition realises itself, i.e.,
here, at the time when the father dies and leaves his name to his
son-in-law. In other words, the Council of State adapted the
administrative procedure to the specific features of the name and
arms clause.
Even the Court of Cassation may not be completely opposed to
the name and arms clause in this first half of the 19th century.
Indeed, in 1813, the Court rejected the argument that to promise to
bear another’s name as part of a wedding contract is, in principle,
contrary to the law of 6 fructidor an II. 43 Thus, the lack of liberty
to change one’s name established by this law does not render the
name and arms clause invalid per se. However, it does endanger
its survival, even though there may not be a direct antagonism to
the practice. Indeed, the loss of liberty to change one’s name goes
hand in hand with the obligation to comply with the procedure set
out in the law of 11 germinal an XI, an obligation that the French
courts, whether Council of State or Court of Cassation, enforce
strictly.
As a result, as long as the beneficiary of a name and arms
clause does not use the procedure, he will be considered as not
having complied with the clause. This is so even if he believed he
had already been authorised to change his name because the
French Government had granted an ordinance stating he could
change his name, but obviously without having respected the
procedure of law of 11 germinal an XI. 44
This loss of liberty to change names renders the name and arms
clause a much less attractive tool in French law. Its drafter runs
the risk that his wishes may not be respected despite the
willingness of those benefiting from the clause to comply with it.
If we add the fact that the procedure is costly 45 and involves a risk
of the request being rejected by the Government, in the long term
the clause would only lose its appeal and by the mid-nineteenth
century onwards, there is no case law attesting of the practice. 46
43. Cass. Civ., January 13th, 1813 S.1812-1814, 2, 259.
44. CE, December 16th, 1831 S. 1832, 2, 103; Cass. Req. April 22nd, 1846 S.
1848 I 417.
45. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 190 and n. 9. The procedure
became less costly closer to the 20th century.
46. The last case is of 1846: Cass. Req., April 22nd, 1846 S. 1848 I 417.
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Certainly, the clause is still mentioned in books related to
donations and wills, but the authors never cite a case less than fifty
to sixty years old, and they all affirm the necessity to comply with
the procedure of law of 11 germinal an XI. 47
In 1910, E. Perreau suggested that the clause was rarely used
and he noted indeed that “for more than sixty years, our case law
reports do not contain any decision on this question.” 48 Thereafter
the clause ceased to be mentioned anywhere. Hence, after
centuries of similar practice, French law finally departed from
English law. The impossibility to assume one’s name by
reputation without prior authorisation finally got the better of the
name and arms clause. 49 This is however only part of the story. If
the name and arms clause disappeared in French law, it is also
because it faced a new challenge at the end of the 19th and
beginning of the 20th century. Associated with the concept of
property until then, the name and arms clause could only be
affected by the movement among French scholars to condemn the
idea that the name could be property, an idea which will be from
then on considered as the correct interpretation of what the name
is. In that sense, French and English law have never been so far
apart, for even if English law does not consider the name property,
it still allows for the name and arms clause to be used in contracts
and wills.
47. See M. TROPLONG, DES DONATIONS ENTRE VIFS ET TESTAMENTS, OU
COMMENTAIRE DU TITRE 2 DU LIVRE 3 DU CODE NAPOLEON 276, §256 (H. Plon
1872): la condition de prendre le nom du testateur est très légale, et elle met
l’héritier dans l’obligation d’y satisfaire,” the author however cites no other
cases than a 1836 one (July 4th, 1836, D. 1836, 1, 302); id. G. BAUDRYLACANTINERIE & M. COLIN, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL:
DES DONATIONS ENTRE VIFS ET DES TESTAMENTS 77, § 177 (Larose 1895).
48. PERREAU, supra note 11, at 156.
49. Nowadays, the Council of State refuses to grant a change of name as a
condition to execute a will or to the person wishing to take that of his mother.
See respectively, D. Pepy, Les changements de nom dans le droit français, in
ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL D’ETAT 1966-67 31, 36; and F. Bernard, Le
Conseil d’Etat et les changements de nom, ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL
th
D’ETAT 1977-1978 67, 78. The law 57-133 of February 8 , 1957 (following a
nd
law of July 2 , 1923) remedied only partly to the loss of names due to lack of a
direct male line. See I. De Silva, Le changement de nom devant le Conseil
d’Etat: le relèvement du patronyme menacé d’extinction. Conclusion sous CE n.
236470 du 19 mai 2004, REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE
1153, 1159 (2004); and F. Petit, La mémoire en droit privé, RRJ 17, 38-39
(1997).
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B. The Theoretical Justification of the Practice: Dispelling
Confusion
Confusion stems as much from the evolution French law went
through, as from French law contrasted with English law. Until
the early 20th century, the name was considered to be property in
French law, in contradiction to the English law’s understanding
that the name is not, as the Privy Council reminded the plaintiffs in
the 1869 case of Du Boulay. Afterwards, because of the
movement among French scholars in the 1900s, French law
adopted what is apparently the same position as English law, but
on grounds which make one wonder if the two laws of surnames
mean the same thing. To dispel this confusion, we must first
understand English law’s approach to the act of disposing of one’s
name, for it reflects on French law’s original conception of the
name. This initial analysis will shed light on the subsequent
rationales French law had adopted, highlighting where the
confusion lies.
In Du Boulay the Privy Council affirmed for the first time the
accepted understanding that the name was not property in English
law. Strictly speaking, the case does not involve a name and arms
clause, but rather raises the issue of whether a person can protect
her/his name against use by another in English law. Nonetheless,
the judgment’s wording is broad enough for the decision to
encompass the name and arms clause within its declaration that the
name is not property. A comparison between the name and the
arms or the title reinforces this conclusion. Indeed, a title is “an
incorporeal and impartible hereditament, inalienable and
descendible.” 50 In other words, it is property, 51 though it cannot
be

50. 35 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 906, at 568 (4th ed. 1994) v.
“Peerages and Dignities.” See notably Earl Cowley v Countess Cowley, (1901)
AC 450, at 457-458.
51. Note that the first meaning of the word “title” is not a dignity, but refers
to “a right of property . . . with reference either to the manner in which the right
has been acquired or as to its capacity of being effectively transferred,”
OSBORN’S CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th ed. 2005), v.
“Title.”
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sold. 52 Similarly, arms are considered property, 53 although “the
right to bear arms is a dignity conferred by the Crown, and not an
incorporeal hereditament.” 54
As a consequence, both title and arms are protected against
assumption and use by another without grant, 55 whereas the name
can be assumed and used freely without formality. 56 If there is “a
personal right to bear arms” 57 and title, there is no right to bear
name, just a liberty to do so. Thus, to dispose of one’s own name
in a will is not a sign of a right of property on the name, but rather
the exercise of the liberty to make one’s will conjoined to the
liberty to assume names by reputation. 58 It is not so much about
disposing of or transferring a thing, object of property, than
exercising a liberty to assume a name in order to be able to
maintain its existence. The fact that English Law insists so much
on the name and arms clause being a voluntary assumption of a
name rather than a transfer of it can be seen in Doe d Luscombe v
Yates (1822) 59 where the beneficiary of the will had assumed the
testator’s name of Luscombe before he came into possession of the
estate, i.e. before the name and arms clause took effect. 60 If the
52. A contract for the purchase of a title is contrary to public policy and
void. Parkinson v College of Ambulance Ltd and Harrison, (1925) 2 KB 1.
53. Stubs v Stubs, [1862] 1 H & C. 257; In re Croxon, Croxon v. Ferrers,
[1904] 1 Ch. 252, 258. Note that the common law courts do not have
jurisdiction, see HALSBURY’S, supra note 50, at § 970, p. 599.
54. 42 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 749 (4th ed. 1994) v.
“Settlements”; and Manchester Corpn v Manchester Palace of Varieties Ltd,
(1955) P 133, (1955) 1 All ER 387.
55. Title: Earl Cowley v Countess Cowley, (1901) AC 450, 460; see 2
JARMAN ON WILLS 1532, 1533 (8th ed 1951).
Arms: In re Croxon, Croxon v. Ferrers, (1904) 1 Ch. 252, 258; In re Berens,
In re Dowdeswell, Berens-Dowdeswell v. Holland-Martin, (1926) 1 Ch. 596,
604-605; and Barlow v Bateman, 3 P. Wms 65, on appeal (1735) 2 Bro Parl Cas
272, HL.
56. Doe d Luscombe v Yates, (1822) 5 B & Ald 544; Davies v Lowndes,
(1835) 1 Bing NC 597; Bevan v Mahon-Hagan, (1893) 31 LR Ir 342, CA; and
Barlow v Bateman, (1730) 3 P Wms 65.
57. In re Berens, at 605.
58. In re Neeld, at 353-354; Re Howard's, at 523; In re Berens, at 604-605;
and Du Boulay, at 447.
59. Doe d Luscombe.
60. John Luscombe Manning was required to assume the name of
Luscombe once he had “attained the age of 21 years” and be entitled to the
estate. However, during his minority, he assumed the testator’s name of
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name and arms clause was a transfer of the name-property, the
name could not be used before the clause became effective, i.e.
before Luscombe inherited the estate. However, Luscombe, like
any disposee, did not need the clause to be able to bear the name:
he retained the possibility to assume the testator’s name, whether
or not the latter drafted the clause.
That English law puts the emphasis on the liberty to assume
another’s name rather than on the transfer of name-property by the
testator does not surprise when compared to what we know of the
origin of the name and arms clause in French law. The French
medieval concept of saisine is the prolonged use of a “thing” that
does not create a right of ownership, but that extinguishes the right
of others to complain about the use. 61 Like in English law, what
matters is that there is an assumption of a name for a period of time
long enough for the person to secure the use of his name, a bit like
an adoption, rather than a donation. 62 The emphasis is on the
liberty to change name rather than on the testator’s supposed right
to transfer the name. And because, like in English law, the French
saisine is neither property nor possession, the name is not property,
but rather the object of an exercise of liberty. But whereas English
law will retain this approach, French law will progressively drift
away from it by superposing the concept of property on the notion
of saisine and its related feature, the name and arms clause.
The association between name and property results from a
combination of factors which taken separately are not conclusive
and demonstrate how problematic the assimilation between name
and property can be. It all started when, at the end of the Middle
Ages, French lawyers ceased to understand the concept of the
saisine. Trained in Roman law, they turned towards the more
familiar concepts of possession and property to explain the features
of the saisine. In his commentaries of the Justinian Code, Balde (†
1400) affirmed that the name was bien hors du commerce (a thing
outside commerce), in order to highlight the fact that the right on
the name as known in the saisine does not incorporate the right to

Luscombe and was known thereafter by this surname instead of his own
surname.
61. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 44.
62. Id. at 46.
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sell the name. 63 The link he established between the name and
“goods” (biens) made it tempting later on to try to qualify the right
attached to the name, and what is better suited than the right to
property, which concerns goods? 64
Under that light, the clause mechanism seems to point towards
an act of disposition, indicative not of possession, but more of a
property right on the name. There is a donation of a name rather
than an adoption as it was understood in the Middle Ages. The
onus is thus on the transfer from testator to disposee rather than on
the disposee’s liberty to assume a new name. For French lawyers,
this correlation between name and property is comforted by the
fact that the surname has become hereditary in the sense that the
father gives his name to his children. Again, the emphasis on the
person who “transfers” the name rather on the one who “receives”
it.
This use of Roman law to reshape rationales underlying
existing practices is not surprising. France, like most continental
countries, had been deeply influenced by Roman law–much more
than England ever had been. 65 So although French and English
laws continue to recognise the name and arms clause and the
liberty to assume a new name, by the late 18th century, the
rationale provided changed dramatically, introducing confusion
about what the name is and is not.
The artificial character of the link made between name and
property can be seen in the wording used to describe the French
law of surnames, just before the 1789 Revolution. In 1780, one of
the most important encyclopaedias of French law, the Repertoire
Guyot, stated that “the name is an inalienable property of each
family and household. It suffices to enjoy this property/ownership
to be a male descendant of who bears the name.” 66 One can
immediately see that the features of the original saisine remain:
the name cannot be sold, and the name and arms clause, used
mainly by the nobility because the name is a symbol of the
63. Id.
64. Id. at 83.
65. Even the seisin, which we do not know so far whether it is related to the
saisine, is described as feudal possession, implying a different kind of
possession than that of Roman law. OSBORN’S, supra note 51, at v. “seisin.”
66. Desessarts, in GUYOT, supra note 32, at 168 (author’s translation and
emphasis added), also cited in LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 84, n.
149.
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household, depends on the existence, or rather absence, of a male
line to which the name can be transferred. Thus, the declaration
that the name is property is more a standard clause than the result
of a careful analysis of both the name and the concept of property.
The forgotten saisine which remains in its features has been
dressed up with the ill-suited concept of property.
This evolution of French law would not have had such an
impact if it were not for the success the new explanation enjoyed in
the 19th century. Far from being dispelled, the confusion found a
new life, except that it was not perceived as such, but rather as the
correct view of what the name is. The case of Du Boulay is a
testament to this understanding of the law. The plaintiffs whose
arguments were based on French law cited the Dictionnaire du
Notariat (Dictionary of the Notary), affirming that the name is
property. 67 One would then think that when the presentation was
criticised in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the confusion
would disappear. Certainly, scholars demonstrated that the name
could not be disposed of by the father and thus be hereditary like
property is. 68 So in that sense, one of the factors that led to the
conclusion the name was property has been rejected.
However, concerning the name and arms clause, the link
previously made between property right and liberty to dispose of
the name is never questioned, even by those maintaining that the
name is property, 69 nor by those considering that the name could
not be property. Indeed, the reason why the name cannot be
property anymore is because it cannot be disposed of . . . by a
name and arms clause, for the disposee of the clause cannot change
his name on his own accord but must ask at the very least the
Government’s authorisation! In other words, instead of
67. Du Boulay, at 440, 443.
68. M. PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE

DE DROIT CIVIL CONFORME AU
PROGRAMME OFFICIAL DES FACULTES DE DROIT § 398 at 152 (LGDJ, 4th ed.
1906); and 1 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 141 (1952).

For Planiol, it is the legislation (loi) that obliges the father’s name to be adopted
as a sign of the father-child relationship. The criticism is not without
weaknesses. If it is true that the Civil Code provides for the nomen to be a sign
of possessing the status of son or daughter, it is nonetheless notoriously silent
concerning the surname to be given at birth. Until the reforms of 2002 and
2003, custom dictated that the legitimate child should have his father’s name.
69. SALVETON, LE NOM EN DROIT ROMAIN ET EN DROIT FRANÇAIS 305 (thèse
1887), cited by PH. NERAC, LA PROTECTION DU NOM PATRONYMIQUE EN DROIT
CIVIL (ETUDE DE JURISPRUDENCE) 15 (PUF 1979).
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disappearing, the emphasis put on the testator disposing of the
name, is strengthened by the disappearance of the liberty to assume
one’s name.
The name and arms clause is not analysed anymore as the
conjunction of two liberties, that of making one’s will and that of
changing names, but as simply the act of writing a will that
opposes the principle of immutability of names and that cannot
therefore survive. Perreau, at the heart of the movement
combating the name presented as property in the 1900s, clearly
links the impossibility to dispose of the name with the prohibition
to change one’s name at will. “What instability, indeed, what
difficulties, what confusion and what frauds, in family and
business relationships, if anybody could modify his name as freely
as the composition of his estate (patrimoine)!” 70 Thus, Perreau
associates property with both liberty to dispose of the name and
liberty to assume another’s name: loss of the latter implies loss to
dispose of the name and thus loss of property rights. 71
Paradoxically, but easily understandable as the concept of the
saisine had not yet been rediscovered, 72 Perreau’s reasoning
perpetuates the original confusion introduced after the 15th century,
whereas the original intention of the author is to dispel the
confusion between name and property!
The argument definitely loses its apparent logic when
compared with English law. To follow Perreau’s line of reasoning
means that English law should affirm that the name is property as
it not only accepts the practice of the name and arms clause but
also recognises the liberty to change names. And yet, English law
refuses to consider the name to be property, clearly distinguishing
it from the title and arms. Hence, although English and modern
French laws appear to agree that the name is not property, their
understanding rests on an analysis of their respective practices
which are contradictory. However, as before, this contradiction
70. E. Perreau, De l’incessibilité du nom civil, REVUE CRITIQUE DE
548, 550 (1900).
71. “It appears to us that the Government’s authorisation would be
necessary nowadays, otherwise we would be confronted to a true cession of the
name”, i.e. to the name being a thing object of property, see Perreau, supra note
70, at 552.
72. The major work of A. Lefebvre-Teillard has not yet been written. In
addition, legal history has just been introduced as part of the curriculum in
French law schools.
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does not rest much on what is property in relation to the name.
Rather it builds on an historical misconstruction to which has been
added a new twist by the loss of the liberty to change names in
French law.
The introduction of the concept of extra-patrimonial right to
explain the particularities of the modern French law of surnames
only reinforces this evolution. Indeed, at the same time that
Perreau demonstrated the name cannot be property, he used a new
concept developed by German scholars as explained by Saleilles73
and which put the emphasis on what is a person in relation to
his/her name. The name is the object of an extra-patrimonial right
characterised by four elements: not at disposal, not to be seized,
not transmittable, and not prescribed by time. 74 Opposed to
property rights, the concept puts the emphasis on what is a person
intrinsically. The person’s identity that the name reveals is
confused with the immutability of the person 75 as a human being.
As a result, it made it difficult for French law to conceive that
the liberty to dispose one’s name is not a liberty to dispose of the
person’s identity and essence. It’s as if to recognise both liberties
would be allowing the person to sell him/herself like a vulgar
object of trade, of property. This particular conception of a person
marks the divergence between French and English laws. Thus,
what is at stake behind the liberty to dispose or not of one’s name
is not so much a reflection of what is property than a vision of
what is a person, since the 20th century introduction of the concept
of extra-patrimonial right in French law. Whether a similar
conclusion could apply to the protection of one’s name against the
use by another remains to be demonstrated.
73. R. Saleilles, Le droit au nom individuel dans le code civil pour l’empire
d’Allemagne: Note sous l’article 12 du Code civil allemand, REVUE CRITIQUE DE
LEGISLATION 94 (1900).
74. Among the many studies about extra-patrimonial rights from which is
derived the personality right, see NERSON, supra note 3; and P. Kayser, Les
droits de la personnalité. Aspects théoriques et pratiques, REV. TRIM. DR. CIV.
45, spec. 492 (1971).
75. Perreau, supra note 70, at 559; M. Gobert, “Le nom ou la redécouverte
d’un masque”, I 2966 JCP § 4, 20 (1980); M. Gobert, Rapport de synthèse, in
LA NOUVELLE LOI SUR LE NOM (ARTICLE 43 DE LA LOI DU 23 DECEMBRE 1985)
185, 197 (LGDJ 1985); Munday, supra note 9, at 94. Similarly, to the
philosopher Hume, identity coincides with immutability, Treatise of Human
Nature (1739), Book I, Part IV, section IV; also quoted in S. FERRET,
L’IDENTITÉ 20 (GF Flammarion 1998).
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II. TO PROTECT ONE’S NAME:
THE EXERCISE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT?
Both English and French laws offer protection against the use
of a name by another. Indeed, like Roman law before, 76 they
recognise that a person cannot use another’s name for purposes of
fraud. 77 Beyond this specific situation however they diverge
significantly. Even if there is no intention to defraud, French law
offers to a person legal protection as long as he has not consented
to the use, whereas English law refuses to do so. This divergence
of practice would not have been of any significance for our debate
if French law had not affirmed for a long time that the name was
property, implying that the legal action available to protect the
name was the exercise of a property right on the name. It is this
understanding that the plaintiffs in Du Boulay put forward in
support of their claim that the Privy Council should prohibit the
defendant to bear the name of Du Boulay. Not contesting that
French law recognised a property right, 78 the Privy Council
affirmed the difference with English law: the “mere assumption of
a name by a stranger . . . whatever cause of annoyance it may be to
the family, is a grievance for which our Law affords no redress.” 79
Thus, the traditional interpretation of the case is that in English law
the name is not property. Could it be then that to protect one’s
name against the use by another is a sign of a property right? An
analysis of the argument in French law reveals confusion about the
name being property (A), a confusion the doctrine will try to dispel
in the early 20th century, offering a specific vision of the name in
contrast to the English law’s approach (B).

A. The Source of the Confusion
The possibility for a person to oppose the use of her name by
another arose in the Middle Ages with our already-encountered
76. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 43-46; and HOULLIER DE
VILLEDIEU, supra note 11, at 36-37.
77. Du Boulay, at 440-441; Cass. Civ., June 22nd, 1971, D. 1971, somm.
181.
78. French law was applicable at the time in St Lucia, id. at § 3.
79. Id. at 441.
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French law concept of the saisine. Indeed, the saisine has twotiers: the first, the name and arms clause, is to be exercised when
the name is about to be extinguished for lack of direct male heirs,
on the condition that if other male heirs exist they have to consent
to the transfer; the second, correlative of the first, is for the male
heirs to protect their “right” on the name by forbidding anybody,
including close relatives, to bear their names if they have not
consented that they do so.
Like for the name and arms clause, what matters is to ensure
that the noble name remains within the family or persons to be
trusted, in order to avoid confusion with commoners. This
protection of the name as the symbol of a household is particularly
important in a world where there is, in principle, liberty to use
another’s name as long as it is without fraud. If the protection
were not available, anybody could exercise his liberty to change
names and take a noble name. Thus the nobility needs specific
protection and the saisine provides it by opening a legal action to
all members of a family who do not need to prove damage or
fraud. Those features of the civil action will pass the test of time
untouched. However, the original context in which they were born
will be lost and, like the name and arms clause, by the end of the
18th century until the early 20th century, the legal action will be
presented as the exercise of a property right in respect to both the
holder of the action (1) and the requirement not to prove damage
(2). The confusion could not be greater.
1. The Holder of the Action
Because of the purpose served by the saisine, to protect one’s
name is to protect not simply the name one bears but also the name
of the family one belongs to but does not bear. Thus the legal
action is opened to a variety of persons who have in common their
interest in maintaining the household name intact. Because the
concept of the saisine was misunderstood, as we have seen with
the name and arms clause, French lawyers started to present in
1780 “the name [as] an inalienable property of each family and
household” 80 in order to explain the specific characteristic of the
legal action. The expression survived the turmoil of the French
80. Desessarts, in GUYOT, supra note 32, at 168, v. “Nom” (author’s
translation and emphasis added).
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Revolution, and during the 19th century the courts did not hesitate
to declare that “the family name is their exclusive property,” 81 that
“the name is part of the persons’ status and belongs exclusively to
the members of the family,” 82 or that “the family name is a
property . . . to which even the State cannot impair/infringe without
the consent of the family.” 83
Until the early 20th century, scholarly works maintained the
confusion and alongside the courts, they continued to affirm that
the legal action to protect one’s family name is the exercise of a
property right. Some, however, recognised that a true property
right only offers legal protection to the owner of the property, not
to the owner’s family. In order to provide a more adequate
explanation, they developed two lines of arguments. Either they
presented the name as a special type of property shared with
several people, 84 or they considered the name an example of coownership. 85 In any case, they did not question the affirmation of
the name being property. To the contrary, they perpetuated an
explanation which associated the name with the ill-suited concept
of property whereas the origins of the legal action they tried to
explain rested on the saisine, which resisted any assimilation to
property. Understanding that the unchecked affirmation did not
and could not rest on solid grounds shed light on English law’s
understanding in Du Boulay. Because analysis of French legal
history demonstrates that there is no link between protecting the
name and property, a contrario, there cannot be a link between
lack of protection of the name and lack of property rights in the
name. Thus when English law affirms the name is not property, it
81. Paris, March 20th, 1826, S.V. 1825-1827, 2, 214 ; S. 1826 II 214.
82. Paris, March 22nd, 1828 S.V. 1828-1830, 2, 60. Was at stake here the
action of a father agains the use of his name by his illegitimate son born out of
adultery.
83. Douai, December 26th, 1835 S. 1837 II 188; similarly, Riom, January
nd
2 , 1865, D. 1865, 2, 17 ; Agen, June 26th, 1860, D. 1860, 2, 141. Overall, see
E. Agostini, La protection du nom patronymique et la nature du droit au nom,
DALLOZ chr. 313 (1973).
84. For example, J. A. LALLIER, DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ DES NOMS ET DES TITRES
(Giard 1890); it echoes the Court of Appeal of Riom, January 2nd, 1865 D.P.
1865, 2, 17 “a right sui generis.”
85. 4 J. BONNECASE, SUPPL. TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL DE BAUDRYLACANTINIERE § 290, at 566 (1928); for a summary, see M. Herzog-Evans,
Autonomie de la volonté et nom. Un plaidoyer, RRJ 48-49 (1997); and NERAC,
supra note 69, at 15-17.
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cannot be because it does not protect the name against use by
another (except for fraud).
A similar conclusion applies to the other characteristic of the
legal action recognised in French law and related to the conditions
in which it operates.
2. The Conditions of the Legal Action
According to the traditional presentation, those entitled to bring
a civil law suit to protect their name against use by another are not
required to prove the existence of damage (prejudice).
Assumption of the name suffices to justify their legal action. In
the original context of the saisine, this condition is not a surprise.
The noble name is sufficiently known for its assumption by a third
party to create injury to the family members by the association it
brings between the stranger and the family. In practice, there is
damage, except that it is an implicit but obvious consequence of
the assumption. Proving the assumption equals proving the
damage, and there is no need to require additional evidence. 86
However, the original context of the civil action being lost,
scholars will be puzzled by the affirmation that there is no proof of
damages, especially when compared to the conditions surrounding
another legal action available to protect against the use of
surnames by another, for the latter apparently requires the
opposite, i.e. proof of damage. Indeed, when a person tries to
obtain confirmation of his new surname, he has to request a letter
patent to the Crown, a procedure which evolved to incorporate a
period of time during which people could oppose the change of
name.
Originally, this procedure developed as a consequence to the
name and arms clause and is thus closely related to the other legal
action the male heirs had. It is the nobility that has an interest in
opposing the grant of a letter patent, if it has not already engaged
in direct legal action before the courts. That interest, in its
86. See the example given by LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 48
where the Rochechouart-Mortemart sued their cousin Francois de PontvilleRochechouart for not bearing the name Rochechouart without their consent, but
as a result of a name and arms clause. Centuries later, the family of
Rochechouart-Mortemart will be embroiled in another law suit, Cass. Civ. 1ère,
January 31st, 1978 JCP 1979 II 19 035.
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substance, does not differ from the one at stake in the civil action.
Nonetheless, contrary to the civil courts, the Crown will expressly
require its proof, probably as a means to retain full discretion on
whether or not to grant the letter patent. 87 The administrative
procedure being incorporated into the law of 11 germinal an XI,
and now into article 61 of the French Civil Code, proof of damage
continues to be required, in contrast to the courts’ opposite
affirmation.
But like during the Ancien Régime, the difference does not
really exist and some modern scholars have demonstrated this. 88
Indeed, despite continuing to affirm that no proof of damage was
required, the civil courts never went on to accept any assumption
of name as justifying the plaintiff’s legal action. Paul Dupont (the
John Smith of England) will never succeed in protecting his
surname of Dupont if he restricts himself to prove that another
used it. The courts require more than that mere assumption and are
in that sense respectful of the original purpose of the legal action.
The protection given to the name was born out of the necessity
for the nobility to maintain the prestige of a name and its
associated arms and estate. It is this prestige of a name that
remains a constant preoccupation for the courts. Assumption of an
ordinary name requires proving a specific damage suffered; 89 by
contrast, assumption of a prestigious name or a name with
originality can be sufficient. In other words, the protection of the
name the courts offer still depends on the same rationale that
existed at the origin of the protection; the context may have
changed for the nobility has been abolished, but the foundational
principles remain because they can easily be transferred to non
noble names. 90

87. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 105, spec. n. 237.
88. CARBONNIER, supra note 4, at 192; P. Kayser, La défense du nom de
famille d’après la jurisprudence civile et d’après la jurisprudence
administrative, 10 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 21, 27-29 (1959); and NÉRAC, supra note
69, at 158-161.
89. Nérac demonstrated this caselaw element, id. at 158-159. He even
underlines that the civil and administrative courts hold the same line of
approach, id. at 160.
90. One could even argue that the new nobility of the 19th century are those
celebrities and stars a lot of people seem to aspire to be, like in the previous
centuries, people aspire to nobility.
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This debate would not matter much if it had not been at the
centre of a controversy about whether or not the name is property.
To explain the (unchecked) affirmation that there is no need to
prove damage before the civil courts, scholars consider that the
condition of the legal action is a sure sign of a property right being
exercised. Indeed, not to require proof of damages is, in French
law, a particularity of property law where assumption of the object
of property suffices to create the damage. Thus, the existence of
legal action born out of the saisine seems to confirm that the name
is property, and in the 19th century, the civil courts appeared to be
justified in affirming that the right to the name embodied by the
protection is a property right. Obviously, to declare that the name
is property completely ignores the reality of the case law. For if
the name was property, any name, whether common or rare, would
deserve protection, because any thing, object of property, deserves
protection, whether an old battered book or the priceless edition of
an author’s work. And yet, the courts adopt a different approach.
It raises the question of how the debate about whether or not
the name is property could have been so sidetracked and confused.
That the old concept of the saisine, from which was born the first
legal action, was lost, cannot be overstated as the cause of the
problem. Even lawyers who in the early 20th century challenged
the concept of the name being property took for granted the courts’
affirmation that there was no need to prove damage. Planiol, for
example, acknowledged that “if the name is a property, it is
possible for a person who bears it to ask others to respect it,
without the need to prove that the assumption causes damage.” 91
But having demonstrated that the name cannot be property, he
concluded that the civil courts erred in not requiring proof of
damage and that the opposite stand taken by the Council of State
should prevail in the other legal action available to protect one’s
name. 92 In other words, Planiol challenged what constitutes the
original feature of the legal claim born out of the saisine. The
irony is that historically, the saisine, and therefore the name, never
was property; thus, to affirm, like Planiol did, that the name is not
property, should not cause the very characteristic of the legal
action derived from the saisine to be disputed.

91. PLANIOL, supra note 68, at 152, § 400.
92. Id. at 153, § 400.
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Interestingly enough, Planiol sensed the original context of the
legal action, albeit he reached the wrong conclusions. For him, the
confusion between property and the name rests on the association
between the surname and the name of the land acquired by the
nobility. 93 He is not too far from the truth when noticing the link
between the French law of surnames and the nobility: the saisine
served the nobility’s interests which were often linked at the time
with interests in the land. However, the relationship between the
two never implied for the name to be property. It is the French
lawyers of the Ancien Régime who joined the two together in
imitation of Roman law, rather than by identification of the name
to the land or to a title (i.e. to property). The same lack of
historical knowledge and analysis about what the name really is led
them and others to infer that the supposed absence to prove
damages was a sure sign of property. To understand how this
interpretation spread dispels any doubt that comparison with
English law could create confusion as to the nature of the name.
The affirmation in English law that the name is not property should
not be associated with the quasi-absence, in English law, of a civil
action to protect one’s name. Analysis of French law shows that
there is no link between the two.
In the French civil action to protect the name, the absence of
proof of damage, said to be a sign of property, is more a rhetorical
affirmation than a conclusion having any sound substantial basis.
Certainly, that it remained unquestioned 94 and unchecked until the
middle of the 20th century 95 contributed to the confusion between
name and property in French law. 96 Nonetheless, and strangely
enough, it is not the analysis of the courts’ practice that will lead to
the affirmation that the name is not property.

93. Id. at 152; and PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 68, at 141.
94. Carbonnier wondered if the divergence between the civil and
administrative courts was not exaggerated, CARBONNIER, supra note 4, at 192.
95. Id. at n. 79.
96. Even after those studies, confusion reappears from time to time, see R.
LINDON, LES DROITS DE LA PERSONNALITÉ 177 (1983), who considers that the
protection of the name can be explained as much by the theory of property right
as by the concept of personality right.
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B. The Rejection of the Confusion
The doctrinal reaction against the property nature of the name
arose at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, in
two stages. The confusion between name and property proved to
be easy to dispel with regard to civil actions. If the name were
property, it would mean that several persons possess the name and
exercise the same rights on this thing. 97 However, in French law, a
property right implies an exclusive ownership on an object, on a
thing; there cannot be two owners of one thing with the same
rights. Thus, the name could not be property.
In relation to the conditions of the legal action, the doctrine did
not directly criticise the link made between a civil action in
property law and one related to the protection of names, because in
both cases, according to the courts, there is no need to prove
damage. 98 Rather, they tried to demonstrate that the alleged
practice reflected other concepts than property rights. They were
helped in that by recent developments in case law.
By the late 19th century, the courts extended the protection of
the name against personal use to use for literature purposes. They
did so on the basis of property rights in the name, 99 although they
required the plaintiff to prove damage and an interest to claim. As
scholars observed, such requirement was adverse to the concept of
property rights; more importantly, what was defended was not the
name as property/good, but the name as the embodiment of a
person and his/her personality or civil status. Linking this analysis
of the protection against artistic use to that of the protection against
personal use, the doctrine proposed a renewed interpretation of the
French law of surnames that radically breaks with the concept of
property rights.
At the turn of the 20th century, to protect one’s name against
use by another is no longer viewed as a sign of a property right, but

97. PLANIOL, supra note 68, at 151; PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 68, at
141; and 1 RIPERT & BOULANGER, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL D’APRES LE TRAITE DE
PLANIOL 377 (LGDJ 1956).
98. To the exception of Planiol, id.
99. Trib. Seine, February 15th, 1882, S. 1882, 2, 21; see LEFEBVRETEILLARD, supra note 10, at 183-184.
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the consequence of the name being an element of civil status 100
and the object of an extra-patrimonial right. 101 As we have seen
regarding the disposal of a person’s name, the emphasis is put on
the intrinsic values a person carries with him, without looking at
their monetary/economic worth. 102 It is the person who is at stake;
because the name embodies a person both in its individual and
family dimensions, it deserves protection whenever another person
uses it, even if there is no fraud. Thus to the name is attached an
extra-patrimonial right, not a property right.
The new rationale did not lead to challenge the traditional
presentation that the civil courts do not require proof of damage
when the personal use of another’s name is at stake. Nothing is
said about the contradiction of using the same rationale for the two
actions but differentiating on their conditions. And if the link with
the administrative procedure available to protect one’s name is not
made anymore, again the latter procedure is said to rest on proof of
damage and is still in contrast with the civil action for personal
use–even though nowadays, some scholars argue that there is no
difference.
Nonetheless, the concept of extra-patrimonial right definitely
excludes any reference to property right. In that sense, French law
finally reached the same conclusion as English law: the name is
not property. Yet, behind this common perception of what the
name is not, lies a different conception of the person. English law
does not know the concept of extra-patrimonial rights and presents
its own limited protection of the name as part of the law of torts, 103
notably the protection of the name against its use for artistic
purposes when that use falls within the remits of the tort of
defamation. Certainly, French law does not ignore this link with
torts as the legal actions are predicated on articles 1382 and 1383
of the Civil Code. 104 However, the related case law does not fall
under those articles but under article 57 of the Civil Code, which is
related to the registration of birth. And none of the torts textbooks
100. A. Colin, D. 1904 II 1, commentary under Paris January 21st, 1903. A.
COLIN & H. CAPITANT, COURS ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 360
(Dalloz 1923).
101. PERREAU, supra note 11.
102. There are other extra-patrimonial rights: right to life, right to honour,
right to one’s own image, right to privacy.
103. Du Boulay, at 446-447; and Cowley, at 460.
104. Influence of Planiol, PLANIOL, supra note 68, at 153, § 401.
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analyse the case law, leaving this aspect of the law to the books
dealing with Introduction to French Law or Law of Persons (droit
des personnes). It is as if French law’s vision of the person and
his/her name supersedes any other approach. It is not simply that
the name is not property; it is that the name cannot be property
because it incarnates the person. It is this vision that will
ultimately maintain the difference that arose, in the early 19th
century, between English and French laws in relation to another
feature of the law of surname: the liberty to change names. How
this liberty figured in the debate about the name being property
needs now to be investigated.
III. TO CHANGE ONE’S NAME:
AN INDICATION OF A PROPERTY RIGHT?
The liberty to change one’s name was never argued as the
exercise of a property right. In English law it still exists, and in
French law it existed despite the name being associated at the time
with property. Paradoxically, it is the loss of liberty to change
names in French law which reinforced the claim that the name was
property; a claim made, as we have seen, in relation to both the
name and arms clause and the protection against use by another.
The origin of the issue is indeed the establishment of the
immutability principle (A), the stringent effects of which the courts
set to counteract by maintaining the rhetorical but convenient
affirmation that the name was property (B) before the doctrine
moved away from such confusion.
A. The Origin of the Issue: Establishing Immutability of Names in
French Law
The liberty to change names was a basic feature of the French
law of surnames until the Revolution, as much as it was, and still
is, in English law. However, during the three centuries preceeding
the Revolution, the French monarchy conducted a policy to restrict
the liberty to change names in order to control the nobility, which
was seen as a threat to the Monarch’s power, as well as with a
view to strengthen the civil registry applicable to all subjects. The
Crown used two tools: the procedure of letters patent and the
ordinance of 1667 on civil procedure. With the first, which gave
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discretion to the Crown to refuse or accept the request, the Crown
tried to control the change of names and arms the nobility
undertook. However, despite the progressive increase of letters
patent since the 16th century, their numbers remained low. 105
With the ordinance of 1667, the Crown found a more efficient
way to restrict the liberty to change names. Indeed, the ordinance
of 1667, by requiring proof of age, marriage and death by the civil
register rather than by witnesses’ testimony, 106 progressively
obliged ordinary people to keep the name they had been registered
under at birth and later at marriage. Establishing an efficient civil
status registry enabled the monarchy to create more obstacles for
people to change their names.
Hence, compared with England, France took a rather different
path. Where France strengthened the monarch’s power, the
English monarchy abandoned the inclination to impose absolutism.
As a consequence, the relationship between the State and its
citizens or subjects was that of fierce non-interference. For matters
concerning only the individual, like the name–and as long it was
not linked with claiming a title–the English Crown could not
intervene without being perceived as an arbitrary power infringing
on civil liberties. 107 As a result, the civil status registry would not
be imposed before the middle of the 19th century, but it would
never be associated with control of the name. In addition, a
person’s actual and official names can be different from what has
been written on the birth certificate. 108

105. It is inferior to the number of letters patent to secure legitimacy,
LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 106, notably n. 241.
106. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 94-95; G. Sicard, L’identité
historique, in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE. ETUDE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS
ET DE DROIT COMPARE 115, 133-137 (Pousson-Petit dir., Bruylant 2002).
107. J. Pousson-Petit, L’identité de la personne humaine au Royaume-Uni,
in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE. ETUDE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET DE
DROIT COMPARE 343, 345-351 (Pousson-Petit dir., Bruylant 2002); and J.
Pousson-Petit, Conclusion, in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE. ETUDE DE
DROIT FRANÇAIS ET DE DROIT COMPARE 979, 982 (Pousson-Petit dir., Bruylant
2002).
108. The Birth Registration Act 1953 does not allow for a change of
surname to be registered on the birth certificate. Thus a change of surname will
be recorded most of the time by deed poll, 35 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND §
1276, at 770 (4th ed. 1994) v. “Personal Property;” and J. F. JOSLING, CHANGE
OF NAME 23-46 (Oyez Pub. Ltd 1980).

2008]

IS THE NAME PROPERTY?

51

Nonetheless, the difference between England and France until
the Revolution should not be overstated. In France, the King’s
attempts to curb the liberty to change name never led to the
adoption of a general ordinance to prohibit changes of the name
without his authorisation. However absolute the power of the King
was, it was never so absolute as to override Roman law and
custom, on both of which the liberty to change names rests. 109 It is
thus not surprising that most lawyers up to the middle of the 18th
century agreed that people were at liberty to change name, 110 and
the practice reflected this liberty. In the rare cases where letters
patent were sought to secure a change of name, they would
sometimes be granted 50 years after the change occurred. 111
Therefore, the lack of liberty to change names is a “recent
invention” 112 in the French law of surnames. It is with the
Revolution in 1789 that the monarchy’s aspiration to control
mutability of names became a reality. The Revolution not only
confirmed the civil status registry, with its emphasis on the name
as a means of identification, but it also took the step in 1794 to
affirm the immutability of names; this was extended to all citizens
with the abolition of the nobility on August 4th, 1789. The breach
with the past was consumed, and the French law of surnames
ceased to be similar to its English counterpart. The various
governments following the Revolution never questioned the
revolutionary legislation, but rather reinforced it in 1803 by
creating a procedure to change names–inspired by the previous
system of letters patent–and in 1858, by criminalising the
assumption of names when it included an assumption of titles.
This importance of the principle of immutability of names
cannot be over emphasised, not only because it introduced a major
shift between the English and French laws of surnames, but
because it led to a misunderstanding about the origins of the
109. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 109.
110. Id. at 103-104
111. Id. at 109. In this example, the will was drafted in 1662, the name and
arms taken in 1692, but the change of name secured only in 1747 by letters
patent, the claimant wishing “to prevent any matter of trouble and to secure
better the right that the ascendant and father transmitted to him” (author’s
translation).
112. Herzog-Evans, supra note 85, at 56; F. Thibaut, Le nom patronymique
et l’attitude de l’Etat français à l’égard des changements de nom, RRJ 17, 21
(1989).
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French law of surnames, which fuelled in return a propensity in the
19th century to declare the name to be property, up to the point that
the created story found its way to the Privy Council in the 1869
case of Du Boulay.
At the end of the Revolution, doctrine and the courts asserted
that the former monarchy forbade all changes of names that it did
not authorise. Although a myth, this historical perspective resulted
from a series of works, notably that of La Roque, in his treatises on
nobility (1678) and on the name (1681). 113 He not only falsified
an ordinance of 1555, where the King indeed forbade the change of
names (though not in the terms the author mentioned), but he also
conveniently forgot to mention that the ordinance was actually
never registered, and thus never applied. 114 This presentation
echoed the monarchy’s need, and later the Revolution’s wishes, to
ascertain control on the name as an element of civil status. Such
an opportunity to find an “old” text ascertaining the principle of
immutability of names was too good to be discarded and the
fabricated historical justification of the principle found its way in
to one of the main legal dictionaries 115 just before the Revolution
broke. Given that the author of the 1785 text, Henrion de Pansey,
became President of the Court of Cassation after the Revolution, it
is hardly surprising that nobody questioned the source. Certainly
Merlin, 116 who was not necessarily on good terms with De Pansey,
tried to research the matter, but was only able to find that the
113. GILLES-ANDRE DE LA ROQUE, TRAITE DE LA NOBLESSE ET DE TOUTES
SES DIFFERENTES ESPECES (1678), availalbe at http://gallica.bnf.fr (last visited
November 6, 2008); and GILLES-ANDRE DE LA ROQUE, TRAITE DE L’ORIGINE
DES NOMS ET DES SURNOMS, DE LEUR DIVERSITE, DE LEURS PROPRIETES, DE
LEURS CHANGEMENS, TANT CHEZ LES ANCIENS PEUPLES QUE CHEZ LES FRANÇAIS,
LES ESPAGNOLS, LES ANGLAIS, LES ALLEMANS, LES POLONAIS, LES SUEDOIS, LES
ITALIENS AUTRES NATIONS (1681).
114. The deception was uncovered by A. Lefebvre-Teillard to which this
paragraph is indebted, see LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, supra note 10, at 96-101.
115. GUYOT, supra note 32.
116. Merlin (1754-1838), said Merlin de Douai (of Douai–a French town),
was a solicitor before one of the highest courts in France before the French
Revolution, le Parlement de Paris; and he edited the original edition of the
Repertoire Guyot in 1784-1785. During the Revolution, he proposed to abolish
feudality and to establish one single supreme court, the future Court of
Cassation. A very active supporter of the Revolution throughout the ten years it
lasted, he managed to escape the onslaught of the Terror and, with Napoleon in
power, became in 1801 the Procureur Imperial to the Court of Cassation.
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ordinance of 1555 was probably not registered; he was unable to
undo completely the Ariane’s thread that the story represented.
Hence, the ordinance of 1555 found its way into the nineteenthcentury French law of surnames as a text that supposed to support
the idea that the immutability of names had always been an
essential feature of the French law of surnames, long before the
Revolution chose to enact the law of 6 fructidor an II. Lawyers
forgot that the French law of surnames was actually different,
although the cases between 1800 and 1850 reveal that citizens
needed a bit more persuasion and time to become accustomed to
the new prohibition on the change of names without the prior
authorisation of the government. 117
The deception about what the actual French law of surnames
was prior to the Revolution could have remained of no
consequence for the purpose of this study, but it found its way in to
the very case where English law affirms its divergence with French
law, at least as understood at the time by French lawyers. Indeed,
in Du Boulay, the Privy Council had to examine what the French
law of surnames was prior to and after the French Revolution.
According to the treaty of 1815, French law applied to the
Caribbean island of Saint Lucia. Not surprisingly, the discussion
turned to whether the ordinance of 1555 had ever been applied. 118
The plaintiffs argued it had, and in support of their argument
referred to the 1823 case of Les Heritiers de Preaux de
Longchamps. 119 The French Court of Cassation concluded that the
ordinance of 1555 “although might not have been registered, was
however the manifestation of the royal prerogative” 120 according
to which “to the King only belongs the authorisation to change
names.” 121 Furthermore, the Court of Cassation considered that as
117. See for example CE May 24th, 1851 S. 1851 II 665. In a decision
about the validity of a change granted in accordance with the correct procedure
of the law of germinal an XI, the Council of State notes that “the investigation
reveals that, for a long time, Eugene and Jacques-Jules had been in possession of
the name Gaubert,” being known in their locality (i.e. the island of Martinique)
by that name.
118. With the added difficulty that Saint Lucia was a colony and as such
must have had its laws specially registered.
119. Cass. Req., November 16th 1824, S.V. 1822-1824, 1, 561; S. 1825, 1,
148.
120. Cass. Req., November 16th 1824, S.V. 1822-1824, 1, 561, 563.
121. Id.
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such, the ordinance of 1555 applied to the French Caribbean island
of Guadeloupe, an island which had the same legal status as Saint
Lucia while both were under French dominion. Clearly the
decision supports the plaintiffs’ arguments. However, Lord
Phillimore, for the Privy Council, never addressed the case; at least
not in his written opinion transcribed in the Law Reports. In
addition, he adopted the opposite conclusion to that of the Court of
Cassation: “at all events, it is not shown that this unregistered
ordinance ever formed part of the law of Saint Lucia.” 122 How one
can then explain such divergence of understanding?
Certainly, Lord Phillimore gave an accurate description of the
French law of surnames prior to the Revolution, noting that
“Merlin, in his Repertoire . . . says that the ordinance not having
been registered, never became law in France.” 123 Yet, he also
added that according to the Dalloz dictionary, “the courts hold a
contrary opinion,” 124 a quote which the 1823 French case
illustrated. So why was there such a departure from the Court of
Cassation’s own interpretation? Several explanations can be put
forward: the difficulty to know French law precisely (the 1823 case
does not seem to have been discussed before the courts, and one
wonders if it ever has been); or the social background of the
defendant (the illegitimate son of a former slave of the plaintiffs’
family–upholding French law as interpreted by the Court of
Cassation may have served to maintain the social division). It may
also be the Privy Council was reluctant to condone an
interpretation it probably sensed as being inaccurate. Indeed,
analysing the 1823 case cited by the plaintiffs reveals a hidden
agenda for the French Court: affirming at all costs the immutability
of names.
If the Court of Cassation relied so heavily on the ordinance of
1555 as enouncing a principle that has always been recognised, it
is because it needed a legal basis to refuse the change of name
undertook by one of the parties. The Court of Cassation could not
rely on the ordinance of 1803, which prohibits changes without
Governmental approval, as it had been registered in Guadeloupe
only in 1823, a few years after the facts took place. The Court of
Cassation also knew that the validity of the ordinance of 1555 was
122. Du Boulay, at 446.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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an issue, but to be faithful to historical truth would then have
forced the Court to validate the change of name done without
authorisation. At a time when the French Government was
painstakingly enforcing the opposite principle, such course of
action would have opened the door to much trouble and lawsuits.
The Court of Cassation was not ready to take the risk, and
preferred enforcing a supposedly ever-existing principle of
immutability embodied in the ordinance of 1555. One can see here
the driving force that modelled the French law of surnames during
the 19th century. Immutability of names had to be maintained at all
costs.
This emphasis on immutability of names in French law clearly
contrasts with the English law perception of allowing complete
freedom to choose and change names. Again, it may explain why
the Privy Council was reluctant to follow the Court of Cassation.
But for our debate about whether the name is or is not property,
this emphasis only matters because of what it created. To insist so
much on immutability meant that the French courts were
sometimes placed in a difficult position when plaintiffs asked for a
rectification of the civil status registry in situations where clearly at
stake was a change of name rather than a modification of a clerical
error on the registry books. The only way out was to resort to the
traditional view that the name was property, as the plaintiffs in Du
Boulay reminded the Privy Council.
B. Solving the Issue: Promoting Property Rights vs Promoting
Extra-Patrimonial Rights
Rectification of civil status registry could only be granted if
there had been a mistake in the transcription of the name in the
registry. But what constituted a mistake? Some people argued that
they used to bear a name with de for example, and that by mistake
the particle (particule) was dropped, or that they bore another
name in addition to the one on the registry or in substitution to the
one registered, and that by mistake the other name was dropped on
the birth certificate. Except that the so-called mistake was often a
deliberate move rather than the result of a civil officer’s
absentmindedness. During the Revolution, to register the de–often
but not always a sign of nobility–was a sure sign of trouble, if not a
death sentence in some circumstances in the middle of the Reign of
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Terror in France. Some people had to go as far as changing their
entire name such as “leroy” (literally “the king”) to survive those
difficult times. So to drop part of one’s name to avoid being
suspected of being a counter-revolutionary was a deliberate move
for survival. In that sense, there was no error and the principle of
immutability of names should have meant that the courts had to
refuse the request for rectification of the civil register. On the
other hand, the courts could not be insensitive to the plight of the
plaintiffs, who acted more by constraint than by choice; they were
tempted to accede to the request, but they could only do so if they
found a legal basis that would weight enough to counteract the
effect of the principle of immutability that they paradoxically
promoted. If they found it, they would then just need to ensure
that the claim was genuine and not an indirect way to gain a name
that the plaintiffs never had or abandoned long before the
Revolution.
The French law of surnames, at the time, offered them the
perfect reason: the name was property and thus the claimants just
had to prove they “owned” the name, “possessed” it, i.e. used it for
a long time before the crucial years of the Revolution. In other
words, in order to resolve the dilemma they felt they faced, the
courts used the old features of what was historically the saisine,
and used the theoretical background which superseded the
medieval concept, i.e. property rights. With the old features of the
saisine, they found a way to establish a criterion to assess whether
or not the claim was genuine. It sufficed to ask if there was a “use
of long tempo” as the old French law of surnames defined it (use
which is public, quiet, not contested, and for a long time–a notion
broad enough to give them flexibility in analysing the facts of a
particular case). With the theoretical background created by
lawyers at the end of the Middle Ages, they had a principle as
strong as the principle of immutability, so strong in fact, that the
courts could use it to downplay the stringent effects of the
principle of immutability without appearing to neglect the principle
of immutability. After all, property was a right engraved in the
French Declaration of Human Rights and with liberty, it was a key
foundation of the Civil Code. How could the Government oppose
a property right without being accused, at least implicitly, of
undermining the very foundational elements of France? Therefore,
the concept of property conveniently found a new life. Originally
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a way to integrate the medieval law of the saisine to the prestigious
Roman law, without questioning the freedom to change names as
recognised by custom and supported by Roman law, it became a
tool to instil more liberty into what became a very rigid system
governed by the principle of immutability of surnames and of civil
registry.
As a consequence, the more emphasis there was on
immutability, the more emphasis there was on property rights.
Yet, the association between name and property rights did not
result from a logical analysis of the concept of property in relation
to the features of the French law of surnames. Rather, it was based
on policy matters estranged to the concept of property. When the
concept of property was at last dropped–in the beginning of the
20th century, after scholars demonstrated it was inappropriate and
illogical–the issue remained: how to find a balance between
affirming immutability of names and allowing for some changes
that take place over time? To resolve it, the courts simply went on
applying the same criteria without referring anymore to the
original explanation put forward in the 19th century. Hence, this
last debate confirms how the interrogatory about whether or not the
name is property has been tainted in French law by factors
independent from the concept of property, factors like the
immutability of surnames. The contrast with English law could
not be greater.
Even now, that both English and French law agree that the
name is not property, they still differ in what this affirmation
reveals about their conception of the person in relation to his name.
English law sees the name as part of the one’s personal privacy,
free from interference from the State; French law, despite
recognising to the person an extra-patrimonial right to protect his
name, does not consider the person to be at liberty to choose and
change surnames. 125 Therefore, the real philosophical and legal

125. The evolution of French law is towards more autonomy granted to the
person in choosing names (see Acts 2002-2003), see Herzog-Evans, supra note
85, at 65; S. Shindler-Viguie, La liberté de choix du nom des personnes
physiques, art. 35942 DEFRESNOIS 1409, 1410, 1425 (1994); J.-J. Lemouland, Le
choix du prénom et du nom en droit français, in in L’IDENTITE DE LA PERSONNE
HUMAINE. ETUDE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET DE DROIT COMPARE 631, 669 (PoussonPetit dir., Bruylant 2002); and H. Lécuyer, L’identité de la personne (Pour
l’abrogation des lois des 4 mars 2002 et 18 juin 2003 sur le nom de famille),
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divergence between modern English and French law is thus not on
whether or not the name is property, but on what the relationship is
between a person and her/his name.
CONCLUSION
To our original question, “is the name property?”, the answer is
certainly “no” with regards to three elements of the law of
surnames: whether a person can or cannot dispose of one’s own
name, protect it, and change it. Although until the beginning of the
20th century French law used to affirm the name was inalienable
property, it did so more for lack of a better suited concept to
explain the features of its law of surnames, or to serve other
purposes, than out of a flawless analysis of the concept of property.
It is because the medieval concept of the saisine, which was
neither property nor possession, had been lost that French lawyers
integrated other notions, like property, to provide a theoretical
justification of the law of surnames.
Amid the confused history of the French law of surnames,
English law appears to act as a focal point, especially concerning
two of the features French law used to have before the 1789
Revolution, i.e. the liberty to dispose of one’s name by contract or
will and the liberty to change one’s name without prior
authorisation of the Government. Its affirmation that the name is
not property appears to match the historical sources of the French
law of surnames, although it remains to be proved whether the two
have identical origins. The latter, contrasted with the dramatic
changes French law underwent from the 1789 Revolution onwards,
highlights how its vision of the person and his/her name, which lies
behind the affirmation that the name is not property, is now very
different from that of French law. English law opted for freedom,
refusing to consider that a person’s identity depends on her name;
French law opted for control, partly because of the importance
attached to the name as part of the civil status, and partly because it
identifies the person with his name.
The debate about the nature of the name is not on whether the
name is property or not, but on what the relationship should be

131 LES PETITES AFFICHES 31 (July 1st, 2004). But the contrast with English
law remains striking.
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between a person and his name. And yet, albeit outside the scope
of this article, some issues remain which partly leave open the
debate about whether or not the name is property. The concept of
“privacy” as developed in U.S. law borrows both from the
concepts of property and personality; and in French law, some
argue for the name used for artistic purposes to be part of the
patrimoine, object of property rights, challenging the traditional
classification established in the beginning of the 20th century. 126
More sketches to answer our question need to be done . . .

126. M. Bui-Leturcq, Patrimonialité, droits de la personnalité et protection
de la personne, une association cohérente, DROIT PROSPECTIF–RRJ 767, 781
(2006).

